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Persistence of power, elites, and institutions

Ever wondered why power and privilege persist even in democracies? Discover how elites use “de facto” power to shape systems, maintain inequality, and resist change. Real-world examples reveal the hidden dynamics of political and economic control.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

  1. What is the primary focus of this research paper? This research investigates the persistence of power, elites, and institutions, particularly in societies transitioning from non-democratic to democratic systems. It explores how economic institutions like labor repression are used to maintain elite power, even under democratic structures.

  2. How does the paper model the relationship between elites and citizens? The paper employs a dynamic model with two groups: a finite number of elites and a continuum of citizens. Elites possess disproportionate access to land and can invest in “de facto political power” to influence political outcomes. Citizens have “de jure” power primarily through democratic processes, but their influence can be counteracted by elite actions.

  3. What is meant by “de facto” political power, and how do elites acquire it? “De facto” power refers to the ability to influence political decisions beyond formal institutional channels. Elites in the model gain this power by investing resources, represented by variable θ, in activities that strengthen their political control.

  4. How does the concept of “sluggish economic institutions” contribute to elite power persistence? “Sluggish economic institutions” implies constraints on the speed and extent to which economic institutions can be changed, even under a new political regime. This sluggishness allows elites to retain some economic advantages from previous systems, like labor repression, even after a transition to democracy.

  5. What are the key factors affecting the persistence of non-democratic systems and labor repressive institutions? The model highlights several factors:

    • High economic rents (∆R): Greater gains from labor repression incentivize elites to invest more in maintaining their power.
    • High discount factor (β): Elites with a long-term perspective are more willing to invest in power preservation for future benefits.
    • Low cohesion among elites (M): A larger and less unified elite group faces higher costs in coordinating their efforts to retain control.
    • Sluggishness of institutional change (λ): Slow institutional reform allows elites to benefit from past economic structures for longer durations.

  6. Does the model suggest that democracy guarantees a shift away from elite-favoring economic institutions? Not necessarily. While democracy grants citizens greater political power, elites can still manipulate the system through their investment in “de facto” power. This can lead to a “captured democracy” where democratic processes exist, but economic institutions continue to favor elites.

  7. How does the paper incorporate the idea of “durable political institutions”? The concept of “durable political institutions” is introduced by adding a threshold (ξ) that elites must overcome to change the political system from democracy to non-democracy. This reflects the idea that altering the political structure often requires a substantial concentration of power.

  8. Can you provide an example of the concepts discussed in the paper from real-world history? The paper cites the persistence of the landed elite in the post-Civil War American South as an example. Despite the abolition of slavery, the former planter class retained significant economic and political influence through institutions like sharecropping, which continued to exploit black labor and maintained the pre-existing social hierarchy.

Resources & Further Watching

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